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European Company Taxation: The
Ruding Committee Report Gives
Harmonization Efforts a New Impetus
1. Introduction
A.

BACKGROUND

One of the main reasons for the Europeans to establish a Common Market was
the prospect of substantial economic progress in all Member States. A raising of
the standard of living can only be achieved, however, under economic conditions
where resources are allocated freely to their most productive use. Thus, the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) describes the Common
Market as "an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured."' The authors of the Treaty were
well aware that in a market within which competition was being distorted, an
efficient allocation of resources would not be possible. Article 3(f) of the EEC

*Research Assistant, University of Konstanz School of Law, Konstanz, Germany.
**Research Assistant, University of Konstanz School of Law, Konstanz, Germany.
1. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 (1958), as amended by Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1 (effective July 1, 1987)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty or Treaty of Rome] art. 8(a). Article 8(a) was inserted in the Treaty by the
1986 Single European Act, designed to accelerate the process of European integration by aiming at
the completion of the internal market by the end of 1992.
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Treaty consequently calls for "the establishment of a system ensuring that competition shall not be distorted in the Common Market."
According to conventional economic analysis, competition can be distorted not
only by protectionist trade policies, government subsidies, public procurement
policies, and market imperfections, but also by discriminatory taxes. The distorting effect of discriminatory taxes is explicitly recognized in the EEC Treaty
for taxes on transactions in goods, that is, indirect taxes. 2 Direct taxes, especially
taxes on corporate income, are said to have a similar effect as corporate taxation
may influence decisions on the location, financing, or legal form of investment.
Nevertheless, the possibility of distortions resulting from direct taxation is not
expressly mentioned in the EEC Treaty.
To attain the objectives set out in the EEC Treaty, article 3(h) provides for "the
approximation of the laws of the Member States to the extent required for the
proper functioning of the common market." Given the sometimes discriminatory
character of taxation and the declared necessity to remove the barriers to economic
integration, the establishment of a single internal market may have profound
implications for tax policy in Europe. Nevertheless, the EEC Treaty does not
explicitly refer to a possible harmonization of direct taxes, whereas harmonization
3
of indirect taxes is specifically provided for in article 99 of the Treaty.
B.

INDIRECT TAXES

Not surprisingly, the most progress thus far in the EEC's tax harmonization
efforts has been made in the field of indirect taxation. Considerable progress has
been made in harmonizing the Value-Added Tax (VAT). The VAT was introduced
in the EEC in 1967 by Council Directive 67/227/EEC. 4 This Directive requires
Member States to replace turnover taxes with a common system of VAT. Although
all Member States have applied the VAT since 1987, some still existing differences
in national VAT systems remained to be overcome. One area where an adjustment
seemed necessary was the number and level of VAT rates that varied from country
to country. 5 The Member States rejected a proposal by the Commission in 1987
limiting the number of tax rates to not more than two, a standard rate within the
range of 14 to 20 percent and a reduced rate between 4 and 9 per cent. In June
199 1, however, the Member States reached an agreement. As of January 1, 1993,
2. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 95-97 & 99.
3. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 99 reads as follows: "The Commission shall consider how
the legislation of the various Member States concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms
of indirect taxation, including countervailing measures applicable to trade between Member States,

can be harmonized in the interest of the common market."
4. See Council Directive 67/227 of Apr. 11, 1967, O.J. (71) 1301.
5. The standard VAT rates varied from 12% in Luxemburg to 25% in Ireland. The reduced
VAT rate, applicable to basic necessities such as transactions relating to food, energy, pharmaceutical
products, and books ranged from 0% to 10%. Some countries like Italy even had up to eight different
VAT rates.
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the EEC countries have applied a standard VAT rate of at least 15 percent (without
a ceiling), with one or two optional reduced rates (minimum 5 percent) on certain
defined goods and services. 6
The Member States also agreed on retaining the country of destination principle,
which implies that the goods are exported free of VAT from the country of origin
and that the right to tax the goods is left to the country of their destination. But
without border controls, which disappeared with the realization of the internal
market at the end of 1992, the destination principle is difficult to operate and may
facilitate tax fraud. Therefore, the EEC will probably maintain the destination tax
system only during a limited transitional period until a final VAT system is
implemented at the end of 1996.
To date, the EEC has achieved no harmonization in excise taxes on mineral
oils, alcohol, and tobacco. Excise taxes vary widely from Member State to Member State in number and system as well as in tax rates. Several proposals by the
EEC Commission that sought to solve some of these issues have received only
a cool reception by the Member States. The EEC undoubtedly faces a difficult
task in accomplishing harmonization of excise taxes among its Member States.
C.

DIRECT TAXES

As mentioned above, none of the EEC Treaty's articles provide specifically for
a harmonization of direct taxation. Only article 220 of the Treaty of Rome refers
implicitly to direct taxes by stating that Member States should enter into negotiations with a view to securing the abolition of double taxation within the Community. While the provision expresses a desire to abolish international double taxation, the legal obligation imposed on Member States to attain this objective is
rather weak. The Treaty provides for no sanctions if Member States do not
negotiate. Nevertheless, the EEC countries have created over the years a nearly
complete network of bilateral double tax treaties that comprises sixty-six conventions between twelve Member States. For two reasons, however, these bilateral
treaties fail to remove the obstacles to an internal market to a satisfactory degree.
First, while they help to reduce double taxation, double tax treaties do not achieve
complete abolition of double taxation. Secondly, double tax treaties do not provide
a uniform solution for triangular and multilateral relations among Member States.
A possible solution for the harmonization of direct taxes is article 100 of the
Treaty of Rome. According to article 100, "the Council shall, acting unanimously

6. Some argued that a rate band without any ceiling could lead to wide gaps between the national
VAT rates, thus creating distortions of competition. But the supporters of the present accord refer
to the situation in the United States where significant differences in the level of state sales taxes do
not appear to give rise to major distortions in trade.
7. Nine additional double tax treaties have to be concluded until the system envisaged by art.
220 of the EEC Treaty is completed. See Commission of the European Communities: Guidelines on
Company Taxation, SEC(90)601 final [hereinafter Guidelines].
WINTER 1993
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on a proposal from the Commission, issue directives for the approximation of
such provisions ...as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the
common market." Thus, the only condition for its application is that the respective
legal provisions of the Member States have an immediate impact on the Common
Market. As national direct tax systems are assumed to have such immediate
consequences, article 100 of the EEC Treaty would seem to be a solid and ready
legal foundation upon which harmonization of direct taxes can be based.
It should also be noted that the Member States' tax laws are to comply with
the fundamental freedoms of the EEC Treaty. Specifically, the Member States'
tax laws must not restrict the free movement of capital' and the freedom of
establishment 9within the Community. Tax laws restricting the allocation of capital
investment or the location of a new branch or subsidiary violate the EEC Treaty
and, consequently, must be abolished.
Although article 100 would appear to be an attractive basis for the harmonization of direct taxes, its procedural rules make it difficult to do so. Above all, the
requirement of a unanimous decision by the Council in fiscal matters constitutes
a major obstacle to the harmonization of direct taxes. This requirement leaves
little more than the initiative to the Commission because proposals on direct
taxation can be obstructed even by the smallest Member State.
Despite its weak legal foundation in the Treaty of Rome, the harmonization of
corporate taxation has been discussed within the EEC since the early 1960s. The
Neumark Report (1963)1° and the Tempel Report (1971) " pointed out the need
for harmonization measures on a Community level to the Commission and recommended a uniform corporation tax system in all Member States. The Neumark
Report proposed a split-rate system, similar to Germany's system in force at that
time, to reduce double taxation on dividends, with a lower tax rate on dividend
distributions than on retained earnings. The Tempel Report advocated the classical

8. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 67, requires the Member States to ensure the free movement
of capital only to the extent necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market.
Moreover, according to art. 73(b) of the EEC Treaty, supra note 1, as amended by the Maastricht
Accord, restrictions of the movement of capital are prohibited. See [Proposed] Treaty on European
Union (Council of European Communities and Commission of the European Communities, European
Communities ed., 1992) [hereinafter Maastricht Accord].
9. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 52, 58. Article 52 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 1, gives
companies the right of free establishment in all Member States. The setting up of agencies, branches,
or subsidiaries must not be restricted by tax provisions. See Case 81/87, The Queen & H.M. Treasury
& Commissioners of Inland Revenue exparte Daily Mail and General Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 5505,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,510 (1988); and Werner F. Ebke & Markus Gockel, European
CorporateLaw, 24 INT'L LAW. 239 (1990).
10. An unofficial translation of the Report into the English language was published by HUGH
THURSTON, THE EEC REPORTS ON TAX HARMONIZATION (1963).
11. ARNOLD JAN VAN DEN TEMPEL, STUDIES, COMPLETION-APPROXIMATION OF LEGISLATION
SERIES No. 15 (1970).
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unintegrated corporate tax system 12 throughout the Community. This system still
applies in Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. A Commission proposal
in 1975 aiming at the harmonization of the corporate tax structure and the corporate tax rate met strong opposition by the European Parliament. For the delegates,
a full and real harmonization could not be achieved without harmonizing the tax
base, an element that the draft directive of the Commission did not include. The
Commission's plans to draft a proposal that would also embrace the corporate tax
base were never realized.
After the issue of corporate tax harmonization had been debated for nearly
thirty years without leading to results, the Commission presented a new concept.
In a communication of April 20, 1990, the Commission withdrew its 1975 proposal and announced that it had abandoned the idea of comprehensive corporate
tax harmonization. 3 The Commission stated that harmonization efforts should
concentrate on those aspects of company taxation that may lead to double taxation
and thus obstruct cross-border activities of enterprises within the EEC. The new
approach emphasized, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, 14 the coordination and approximation of tax policies rather than a systematic harmonization.
To underline its seriousness and to give an impetus to the new strategy, the
Commission published in the communication a list of priority measures designed
to eliminate the principal forms of double taxation. It did not take long for the
Commission's initiative to come to fruition. On July 20, 1990, the Council unanimously adopted three proposals of the Commission's priority list. For the first
time in the history of the EEC the Member States agreed on measures in the field
of direct taxation at a Community level.
Of the adopted proposals, the most important is the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, " which was submitted in draft form by the Commission as early as 1969.
This Directive is designed to eliminate double taxation of profits distributed in
the form of dividends by a subsidiary in one Member State to its parent company
established in another Member State. The Directive provides for the Member
State of the subsidiary to abolish any withholding tax and for the Member State
of the parent company to exempt the dividends or to impute the tax paid to the

12. Under the classical system, little or no relief is provided for economic double taxation.
Distributed dividends are fully taxed twice, once at the corporate level and again at the shareholders'
level.
13. See Guidelines, supra note 7, at 605.
14. The principle of subsidiarity, as defined in the Treaty of Maastricht, supra note 8, requires
that "in areas where the Community does not have exclusive competence ....
it [the Community]
should only act when and to the extent that the objectives cannot be achieved to a sufficient extent
by the Member States .....
No Community measure should exceed what is strictly necessary to
achieve the objectives of the Treaty." Once adopted by the Member States, this provision of the
Maastricht Accord will be introduced into the EEC Treaty, supra note 1, as art. 3(b).
15. See Council Directive 90/435 of July 23, 1990, on the Common System of Taxation Applicable
in the Case of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries in Different Member States, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 6.
WINTER 1993
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Member State of the subsidiary against its own tax. The Mergers Directive,' 6 the

preliminary version of which dates back to 1969, provides for any capital gains
arising from a merger, a division or contribution of assets, or an exchange of
shares, to be taxed not at the time of the operation in question, but only when
capital gains have been realized. The EEC Commission's third proposal, the

Arbitration Convention, 7 aims at eliminating, within a specific period of time,

double taxation resulting from adjustments in transfer-pricing.' In order to become effective, the Convention needs to be ratified by all Member States.
Encouraged by the Council's relatively fast acceptance of the proposed measures, the Commission submitted two new proposals' 9 designed to abolish other
forms of double taxation. The first draft directive is intended to abolish withholding taxes on interest and royalty payments between subsidiaries and parent companies established in different Member States. The second draft directive provides
for the deductibility of losses incurred by a foreign permanent establishment or
a subsidiary from the parent company's losses. Since the two proposals meet the
needs of companies, the Commission attached great importance to these draft
directives and urged the Council to adopt them in 1992.20
1H. The Ruding Report

A.

THE RUDING COMMITTEE'S MANDATE

To gain a better understanding of what long-term measures are necessary in
the field of company taxation once the internal market has been established, the
16. See Council Directive 90/434 of July 23, 1990, on the Common System of Taxation of
Mergers, Divisions and Contributions of Assets Taking Place Between Companies from Different
Member States, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1.
17. See Convention 90/436 of August 20, 1990, on the Elimination of Double Taxation in
Connection with the Adjustments of Profits of Associated Enterprises, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 10.
18. The deadline for the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Mergers Directive to be implemented
into national law was December 31, 1991. At that time, out of twelve Member States only two Member
States with respect to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, and one Member State with respect to the
Mergers Directive, had passed the required national legislation to implement the Directive. As a
general rule, a directive exerts effects only if it has been implemented by the national legislative
bodies. Despite this delay, the Directives will still have the desired results. Under certain circumstances, provisions of directives have direct force, so that companies concerned may invoke direct
rights against those Member States that have not passed the implementation laws yet. For details, see
TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 200-11 (2d ed. 1988).
The Commission's harmonization efforts are less successful as far as the Arbitration Convention is
concerned. At the end of 1992 none of the Member States had ratified it.
19. See Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common System of Taxation Applicable to Interest
and Royalty Payments made between Parent Companies and Subsidiaries in Different Member States,
1991 O.J. (C 53) 26; Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Arrangements for the Taking into
Account by Enterprises of the Losses of their Permanent Establishments and Subsidiaries Situated in
Other Member States, 1991 O.J. (C 53) 30. For further details concerning these two proposals, see
Howard M. Liebman, European Tax Law, 26 INT'L LAW. 215, 222-24 (1992).
20. Despite the Commission's urgent call for further harmonization, neither the draft directive
on foreign losses nor the draft directive on withholding taxes on interest and royalty payments achieved
the unanimous approval from the EC Council in 1992.
VOL. 27, NO. 4

EUROPEAN COMPANY TAXATION

1067

Commission charged a committee of independent experts with the task of inquiring
into this question. The Committee was formed in December 1990 under the
chairmanship of Mr. Onno Ruding, a former Dutch finance minister. 2 The Committee met eleven times between January 1991 and February 1992 and submitted
its report to the Commission on March 18, 1992.22 On the basis of its mandate,
the Committee inquired into the following questions:
a. Do differences in taxation among Member States cause major distortions in
the internal market, particularly with respect to investment decisions and
competition? Special attention is focused on those distortions considered to
be discriminatory with respect to enterprises and shareholders of other
Member States.
b. In so far as such distortions arise, are they likely to be eliminated simply
through the interplay of market forces and tax competition between Member
States, or is action at the Community level required?
c. What specific measures
are required at the Community level to mitigate
23
these distortions?
B.

PRINCIPAL TAX DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

EEC

MEMBER STATES

The Committee concluded that the principal differences in the taxation of

business income between Member States relate to the nature of the corporation
tax system, the statutory tax rates, and the tax bases of the Member States.
Furthermore, the tax treatments of cross-border income flows differ. These differences concern not only the imposition of withholding taxes but also the methods
and extent of relief for double taxation in the hands of the recipient.
In the European Community, the corporate tax systems range from a classical
system in Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to the full imputation
system25 in France, Germany, and Italy. Some Member States provide shareholder
relief from double taxation by levying reduced personal tax rates on dividends.
Corporate tax rates differ considerably among Member States. They range from
10 percent in Ireland, for certain industries, to a rate of 50 percent in Germany.26
Further differences among the Member States result from differences in depreciation rules, the tax treatment of losses and capital gains, and the definition of

21. The other members were: Donal de Buitleir (Ireland); Jean-Louis Descours (France); Lorenzo
Gascon (Spain); Carlo Gatto (Italy); Ken Messere (Great Britain); Albert Ridler (Germany); Franz
Vanistendael (Belgium).
22. Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation (Commission, European Communities ed., 1992) [hereinafter Ruding Report].
23. See Ruding Report, supra note 22, at 24.
24. See supra note 12.
25. A system whereby a tax credit is given to shareholders under the personal income tax for the
amount of corporation taxes actually paid on profits distributed as dividends.
26. If local taxes are included, the overall corporate tax rate on retained earnings in Germany
is as high as 57.5%.
WINTER 1993
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business expenses. While the rules of financial accounting have been harmonized
in the European Community, tax accounting principles thus far vary from Member
State to Member State. In Germany 27 and other Member States, for example,
financial accounting principles are also, as a general rule, relevant for tax accounting purposes, subject to certain exceptions provided for by the tax laws.
C. IMPACT OF TAX DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

EEC

MEMBER STATES

According to an empirical survey launched by the Committee, the tax differences among the EEC Member States have a major impact on investment location
decisions of multinational companies. They result in distortions in competition
that impair economic efficiency. Financial activities in particular are affected
by tax considerations. While many other important determinants factor into an
investment location decision, tax induced distortions in competition will most
likely lead to a misallocation of resources within the Community. In order to
improve the Community's overall competitiveness relative to countries like the
United States or Japan, those fiscal distortions need to be eliminated.
D.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Ruding Committee's Approach
The Ruding Committee points out that, even though during the past decade
there has been some convergence of business taxation within the EEC, 2 wide
differences continue to exist. Some of these differences impede the completion
of the internal market. Thus, the key question is whether the harmonization of
national corporate taxation can be achieved by the competition between different
tax systems or whether measures at the Community level will be necessary. The
Ruding Committee concluded that such differences are unlikely to be reduced
much further through independent action by Member States and that distortions
can only be removed by measures agreed to at the Community level.
Other considerations support focusing Community harmonization on the minimum requirements necessary to remove discrimination and major distortions.
These considerations include but are not limited to the need to allow Member
States as much flexibility as possible to collect revenue through direct taxes, the
linkage between corporate tax and personal income tax, and the principle of
subsidiarity. 29 Furthermore, the need for unanimity on tax matters requires a
pragmatic approach.
27. German Income Tax Statute of Sept. 7, 1990, § 5(1), 1990 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI.
1] 1898.
28. According to the Ruding Committee, the convergence in corporate tax rates results from the
growing desire of some Member States to establish more neutral tax regimes from a domestic standpoint, rather than from tax competition among EEC Member States or EEC Member State and
non-EEC countries.
29. See supra note 14.
VOL. 27, NO. 4
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For these reasons, the Ruding Committee based its recommendations on the
view that, at this stage of the Community's development, action at the Community
level should concentrate on the following priorities:
a. removing those discriminatory and distortionary features of countries' tax
arrangements that impede cross-border business investment and shareholding;
b. setting a minimum level for the statutory corporation tax rate and common
rules for a minimum tax base, so as to limit excessive tax competition
between Member States intended to attract mobile investment or taxable
profits of multinational firms, either of which tend to erode the tax base in
the Community as a whole; and
c. encouraging the maximum transparency of any tax incentives granted by
Member States to promote investment. 30
The recommendations made by the Ruding Committee within the framework
of these priorities are divided into two categories: the elimination of the double
taxation of cross-border income flows and the harmonization of corporate taxes.
Additionally, the Committee presents, in Annex 10 A of its Report, two proposals
for a common EEC corporate tax system.
The Committee has included in its recommendations a schedule for their implementation. Each proposal is classified as falling within one of three phases according to the urgency of its implemention. Phase I recommendations ought to be
implemented by the end of 1994. Preparatory work on Phase H recommendations
should begin immediately with a view to implementation during the second phase
of the Economic and Monetary Union. 31 The implementation of Phase I recommendations is envisaged concurrently with full economic and monetary union.32
2. Elimination of Double Taxation of Cross-BorderIncome Flows
Even though considerable progress in the area of double taxation has been
made by the adoption and subsequent implementation of the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive,33 room for improvement still exists. To ensure the removal of fiscal
obstacles to companies that operate in more than one Member State, the Ruding
Committee recommends extension of the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive
to cover all companies subject to corporate tax irrespective of their legal form
(Phase I). The directive should be subsequently extended to all other enterprises
subject to income taxation (Phase II).
With respect to dividends received by individual shareholders the Committee
30. See Ruding Report, supra note 22, at 202.
31. According to art. 109(e)(1) of the EEC Treaty, supra note 1, as amended by the Maastricht
Accord, supra note 8, the second stage towards the Economic and Monetary Union is to begin on
January 1, 1994.
32. The third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union will start no later than January 1, 1999.
See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 109(j)(4), as amended by the Maastricht Accord, supra note 8.
33. See supra note 15.
WINTER 1993
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recommends a uniform withholding tax of 30 percent. This withholding tax would
be waived provided that the shareholder submits proof of his or her status as an
EC resident taxpayer (Phase II).
The Committee also urges the Member States to adopt, as soon as possible, the
two pending directives dealing with withholding taxes on cross-border interest
and royalty payments and with the Community-wide compensation of losses of
permanent establishments and subsidiaries 34 (Phase I). To eliminate double taxation arising from transfer pricing disputes, the Committee recommends that the
Member States ratify the Arbitration Convention 35 and establish appropriate rules
concerning transfer pricing adjustments by Member States (Phase I).
Furthermore, the Ruding Committee discussed the issue of the interjurisdictional allocation of the corporate tax base, also a possible source of double taxation. The experts examined whether lessons could be drawn from the experience
of other multi-jurisdictional states such as Canada, Switzerland, and the United
States in this field of taxation.36 Although the Committee acknowledged that the
separate accounting method, currently used by most European states to allocate
the income of multinational companies, was not always easy to implement in
practice, it saw no need for introducing a system of formula allocation within the
EEC in the near future. According to the Committee, the introduction of a formula
allocation method "might be reconsidered when a much higher level of integration
between Member States is achieved, in particular, when group treatment has been
37
introduced for enterprises located in different Member States."
In regard to bilateral double tax treaties between Member States, the Committee
recommends improvement of existing treaties. Additionally, the Committee suggests that the EC Commission define a common policy on double tax treaties in
respect to Member States as well as third countries (Phase I).

34. See supra note 19.
35. See supra note 17.

36. In the United States, for instance, states use a formula to allocate the income of multistate
enterprises to the various tax jurisdictions (the " unitary-method"). After determining the total income
of the company subject to allocation to the various states within which the company operates, this
method apportions the income by a formula (usually based on payroll, property, and sales) to each

state.
The European states, on the other hand, prefer the separate accounting method to allocate the
income of companies that engage in business activities in more than one Member State. The separate
accounting method associates each item of revenue and direct expense to its source state. To prevent
companies from manipulating the taxable base (by, say, assigning an inflated amount of income to
low tax states and leaving little income for higher tax states), the transfer-prices of intercompany
transactions or transactions between members of the same group are adjusted under the arm's-length
principle. That is, the prices are calculated as if the transactions took place between unrelated third
parties. For a more detailed exposition of the unitary tax method, see, for example, Henry J. Lischer,
Income Taxation by the States of the UnitedStates: UnitaryApportionmentof the Income of Multijurisdictional Businesses, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 143 (Hans-Jiirgen Vosgerau ed., 1992).
37. See Ruding Report, supra note 22, at 130.
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3. Corporate Taxes
The three components of corporate taxes upon which the Committee focused,
were the statutory tax rate, the tax base, and the tax system.38
a. Tax Rate and Tax Base
In order to face the risks of serious erosion of corporate tax revenues by
unrestricted competition between Member States, the Committee recommends
that a minimum corporation tax rate of 30 percent be introduced (Phase I). This
rate should apply to both retained and distributed profits. Since the Ruding Committee believes that competition between Member States will not result in decreasing tax rates and that wide differences between these rates distort the functioning
of the internal market, the Committee also proposes a maximum corporation tax
rate of 40 percent39 (Phase II).
Harmonization of corporate tax rates, however, makes little sense without some
degree of harmonization of the tax base. Therefore, the Committee suggests that
the rules for determining the tax base be approximated without delay (Phase I).
Though it makes some specific recommendations, the Committee proposes that
the technical problems should be examined by another group of independent
experts.
b. Corporate Tax System
The different tax treatment of domestic and foreign-source income is related
to the different corporate tax systems within the Community. Given the current
level of integration, Member States are unlikely to be willing to introduce a
common corporate tax system. The Ruding Committee therefore proposes that
the Member States at least mitigate discrimination resulting from the different tax
treatment.
Thus, the Ruding Committee suggests that Member States that currently provide relief for dividends paid out of domestic-source income to domestic shareholders (whether individual or corporate) either in the form of an imputation
credit or as a reduced rate of personal tax be required to extend similar treatment
to dividends paid out of profits originating from other Member States (Phase I).
This suggestion encompasses a proposal that corporate shareholders be allowed
to offset foreign corporation taxes against domestic imputation taxes 4° and that
individual shareholders be given equal tax treatment irrespective of the source of
38. The term "tax system" is used to describe the manner and the extent to which tax relief is
provided to shareholders in respect of corporation taxes levied on profits distributed as dividends.
39. Local taxes on corporate income, such as the German municipal trade tax (Gewerbeertragsteuer), should be included in the statutory tax rate within the range of 30% to 40%.
40. The term "imputation tax" is used to describe the mechanism by which Member States which
operate an imputation tax system ensure that any dividend distribution which carries a tax credit has
been subject to domestic tax at the corporate level. It includes prscompte (France), Ausschatungsbelastung (Germany), imposta di congualio(Italy), and advance corporation tax (Ireland and the United
Kingdom).
WINTER 1993
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dividends. This solution would be in accordance with the principle of source
country entitlement since the shareholder's country of residence bears the cost of
tax relief.
The Committee admits that the implementation of this recommendation cannot
remove all possible distortions. Additionally, for example, Member State A which
provides some kind of tax relief for its residents' domestic dividend income,
would probably be unwilling to grant the same tax exemption for foreign dividends
when the source country B does not provide its residents any tax relief and
consequently does not provide tax relief for dividends paid by a state A company. 4'
This conduct, however, would be in accordance with the Committee's proposal
since it merely requires the Member States to treat foreign dividend income like
domestic dividend income. This example shows that distortions do not arise only
from the way dividend income is being treated in the country of shareholders'
residence, but also from the differences in the source country's corporation tax
system.
Accordingly, the Ruding Committee suggests that the Community should make
further efforts to achieve a more harmonized corporate tax system within the
Community. Such a common corporate tax system, as a long-term objective,
should be neutral with respect to the competition between different forms of
business associations (incorporated versus nonincorporated businesses), between
different methods of financing (debt versus equity finance), and between distributed and retained profits. Furthermore, the neutrality of investments in domestic
shares and in foreign shares should be warranted. The Ruding Committee points
out, however, the difficulty in determining an appropriate corporate tax system
that will completely satisfy all criteria.42
The Ruding Committee discusses different approaches to a common corporate
tax system. 43 The Committee states that neither a classical corporate tax system
nor an imputation system meets the requirement of tax neutrality in competition.
The Committee also reviewed the recent proposals of the U.S. Treasury on this
issue."4 However, these proposals were considered unacceptable since they would
not allow Member States to tax dividend income according to the personal overall
situation of the shareholder.
A majority of the Committee favors a system that provides some relief from
double taxation of dividends at the level of the individual shareholder and full
exemption for corporate shareholders. The proposed system provides definite
taxation of all corporate earnings in the source country and reduced taxation of
dividend income in the individual shareholder's country of residence. The source
41. See Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk, The Ruding Committee Report-An Impressive Vision of European
Company Taxation for the Year 2000, EC T.R. 22, 32 (1992).
42. See Ruding Report, supra note 22, at 441.
43. See id. Annex 10A" at 439-60.
44. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX
SYSTEMS (Jan. 1992).
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country is entitled to the corporate tax revenue because it bears the cost of the
infrastructure and environment whereas the shareholder's residence country can
tax its residents at a reduced rate and according to their ability to pay.
Il. Conclusion
The Ruding Report provides a fresh impetus for action in the field of European
company taxation by opening the floor for a Community-wide debate of this issue.
The Ruding Report deals with the elimination of double taxation of cross-border
income flows and the harmonization of corporate taxation. With respect to the
elimination of double taxation of cross-border transactions, the Report basically
proposes to improve and extend directives that have already been adopted. The
harmonization of corporate taxation is a more sensitive issue, however. A further
comprehensive harmonization of corporate taxation, including tax systems, tax
rates, and tax base, is an ambitious project. Such a project requires the Member
States to give up a considerable part of their fiscal sovereignty. For this reason,
the Ruding Committee provided a less strict approach that gives preference to
coordination and mutual adjustment of policies rather than systematic harmonization or even the introduction of a single European corporate tax system. The
EC Commission reacted rather reluctantly to some of these proposals.4 5 In the
Commission's view, one should not be carried away by a desire for harmonization
that would not be consistent with the principle of subsidiarity and the respective
responsibilities of the Member States and the Community.
That European integration is difficult became apparent once again in the Danish
and French referenda on the Maastricht Treaty," which demonstrates that the
political environment for a further harmonization of company taxation could
hardly be more hostile. Nevertheless, to maintain the advantages of a unified
market for goods, services, and capital, the Member States must overcome current
hesitations.
Obviously, the increasing integration will inevitably result, to a certain degree,
in a loss of national sovereignty and a transfer of powers from the Member
States to the Community. This development will, however, be warranted by the
economic advantages of integration. Since most of the above-mentioned issues
will, if resolved, not only remove obstacles to cross-border activities within the
EEC, but also improve the competitive position of European business relative to
non-EC-based companies, the Ruding Committee's recommendations should be
implemented as soon as possible.

45. See Commission of the European Communities SEC(92)1118 final; see also Union of Industries of the European Communities (UNICE), Position on the Recommendations for Harmonisation
in the Area of Company Taxes as Made by the Ruding Committee, (1992) INTERTAX 518-23.
46. In Denmark and in France only a small majority voted for the ratification of the Treaty of
Maastricht.
WINTER 1993

